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Abstract 
 
This paper examines framing processes in organizational information system definition, 
acquisition and use. Three theoretical lenses of social cognition are required to 
understand how individuals and groups frame IS problems and solutions. These are: (i) 
socially-situated cognition, (ii) socially-shared cognition, and (iii) distributed cognition. 
These three perspectives are often conflated in studies of that study mental models or 
framing in an IS context. The separation of analytical "levels" reveals different interiors 
of the "black box" of organizational IS design and adaptation, which are not well 
understood. In particular, this methodological framework highlights different 
assumptions concerning whether mental models are static or dynamic, and whether 
cognition is a property of individuals, groups, or technological systems. 
 
Keywords: Social Cognition, Technological Frames, Mental Models, IS Design, 
Sensemaking, Improvisation  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The study of socially-situated cognition is becoming  increasingly common in the 
information systems (IS) literature An interest in theoretical concepts such as 
organizational sensemaking (Weick, 2001), situated action (Lave and Wenger, 1991, 
Suchman, 1987, 1998), technological frames (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994), 
organizational improvisation (Orlikowski and Hofman, 1997, Weick, 1998), technology 
adaptation (Majchrzak et al., 2000, Orlikowski et al., 1995), emergent knowledge 
processes (Markus et al., 2002), and distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1991) reflect an 
attempt to understand the ways in which aspects of individual and group understanding 
inform the definition, design, acquisition, use and adaptation of technological systems 
that are situated within a specific social and organizational-work context. But much of 
this work is ad hoc and fragmented, with little understanding of the traditions that 
underlie these theoretical concepts and the relationship between them.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a structured discussion of different 
theoretical perspectives that are incorporated into situated (or contextual) analyses of 
social cognition. The situated perspective is privileged here because contextual studies of 
social cognition are emerging as an important development in the organizational and IS 
literatures (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994, Porac, 1996, Resnick, 1991, Winograd and 
Flores, 1986). In section 3, a methodological framework is suggested for studies of social 
 cognition in IS, accompanied by a discussion of how these concepts may be 
operationalized. Finally, there is a discussion of how this framework may be applied in IS 
research studies.  
 
Theoretical Lenses For Behavioral Studies of Social Cognition In IS 
 
The study of the processes by which human beings individually and collectively interpret, 
bound and make sense of phenomena and social interactions in the external world 
originated in the fields of cognitive and social psychology. Human beings are thought to 
act according to internal, cognitive structures that represent or symbolize external reality, 
constituting a language of thought (Fodor, 1975). These structures are variously referred 
to as schemas (Bartlett, 1932, Neisser, 1976), personal constructs (Kelly, 1955), scripts 
(Schank and Abelson, 1977) or mental models (Gentner and Stevens, 1983, Johnson-
Laird, 1983). Earlier notions of cognitive processing emphasized information processing 
over the construction of meaning; the importance of both context and meaning became 
de-emphasized as a result (Bruner, 1990). More recently, human cognition has been 
viewed as a process that is situated within a socio-cultural context (Porac, 1996, 
Suchman, 1987, 1993). Thus, meaning "derives from an interpretation that is rooted in a 
situation" (Winograd and Flores, 1986, page 111). Mental models become more complex, 
abstract and organized with experience: this is pertinent in the IS profession, where 
experiential knowledge is valued because it brings an increased capacity for abstraction 
(Vitalari and Dickson, 1983). 
 
These cognitive structure concepts from the psychology literature converge, and are 
extended to organizational research, in the notion of a "frame" (Goffman, 1974, Tannen, 
1993). Framing operates at the intersection of a psychological-cognitive and a social-
behavioral approach to human interaction (Ensink and Sauer, 2003). In framing a 
problem-situation, an individual both structures and bounds those elements of the 
situation that they consider relevant, just as a film-director frames a scene.  
 
Framing As Socially-Situated Cognition 
 
Underlying any study of social interaction is the understanding that individuals inhabit a 
socially constructed world and through their actions, reproduce and give meaning to that 
world (Berger and Luckman, 1966, Kelly, 1955). Individuals operate within distinct 
"social worlds" (Strauss, 1978, 1983) or "communities of practice" (Brown and Duguid, 
1991, Lave and Wenger, 1991): local workgroups possessing their own social norms, 
social expectations and specific genres of communication. But people are also members 
of multiple social worlds, as their work and personal experience intersects with the 
knowledge and interests of different groups (Strauss, 1983, Vickers, 1974). Thus, 
organizational problems and meanings are not consensual but emerge through 
interactions between the various social worlds to which decision-makers belong. People 
behave according to "structures of expectation" (Tannen, 1993) that guide how they 
predict and interpret the behavior of others. Such structures are partly culturally-
predetermined and partly based on prior experience of similar situations (Boland and 
Tenkasi, 1995, Minsky, 1975, Schank and Abelson, 1977, Tannen, 1993). 
 Communications are framed both within a specific, situational context and from an 
individual perspective (Ensink and Sauer, 2003, Tannen, 1993). Individuals provide 
conversational cues, on the basis of which hearers are able to place the communication 
within a specific context. But an individual cannot contribute to a discourse without 
displaying their view on the subject matter. Thus, individual frames are not static, but 
subjected to change during communicative and social interaction (Boland and Tenkasi, 
1995, Ensink and Sauer, 2003, Eysenck and Keane, 1990). Suchman (1987, 1998) 
demonstrates how shared definitions of technology and work spaces are produced and 
reproduced through interactions between technology, people and potential work-spaces. 
Managers and workers make sense of their organizational environment and innovate 
through improvisation, to determine what works in practice and how it may be changed 
(Middleton, 1998, Orlikowski and Hofman, 1997, Weick, 1998, Zack, 2000). 
Organizational processes may no longer be viewed as static, but as "emergent knowledge 
processes" (Markus et al., 2002). Knowledge and meaning therefore derive from situated, 
shared experience, interpreted through continual adaptation and improvisation (Markus et 
al., 2002, Middleton, 1998, Weick, 1998, Zack, 2000).  
 
The core problem, in determining how people frame a specific situation, is that of making 
evidence of internal, cognitive framing structures visible, for analysis. Bruner (1990) use 
of storytelling as a way to elicit implicit perspectives is well-established (Boje, 1991, 
Gershon and Page, 2001, Mitroff and Kilmann, 1975). However, it must also be 
recognized that people invent or post-rationalize narratives, as a way of making sense of 
uncomfortable or inappropriate behavior and situations (Angus, 2001). Boland and 
Tenkasi (1995) suggest that narrative be combined with techniques to stimulate 
reflexivity (Schutz, 1967) and also suggest the use of cognitive maps (Axelrod, 1976, 
Eden et al., 1983) to elicit implicit reasoning. Most studies of situated framing employ  a 
discourse analysis of interview data, observation, or technology interactions. Rommes 
(2002), in a “thinking aloud” study of Internet interactions, found that the way in which 
first-time users interpreted the city metaphor in their use of a digital city internet resource 
was very different to the way in which technical designers framed the ‘city’ metaphor. 
Jacobs (2001, 2002) employed discourse analysis and a co-term analysis of survey data, 
to compare framing constructs held by members of different professional groups. He 
concluded that the similar life-experience of members of specific groups led them to 
frame the role of information technology in similar ways. Prasad (1993) interviewed and 
observed members of diverse occupations, in a computerization project at a large health-
services organization. He concluded that the way in which technology was interpreted 
resulted from sociocultural influences, such as membership of a specific professional 
group, combined with the ways in which their local managers and opinion-makers 
ascribed meaning to the technology. For example, managers who advocated use of the 
new information system by ascribing human qualities to it, such as smartness or 
knowledgeability, raised expectations of how the technology would behave that were 
widely adopted by those who worked for them and which were often at odds with their 
experience. From these studies, it can be seen that meaning and expectations are affected 
both by life-experience (derived through membership of a specific social or work-group) 
and also by interactions with other individuals who work in the same context.  
 
 Socially-Shared Cognition 
 
Groups of people who regularly work together on shared tasks have been observed to 
develop a repertoire of shared frames. Shared frames provide cognitive "shortcuts" that 
permit a group to share common interpretations of the organization without the need for 
complex explanations (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995, Brown and Duguid, 1991, Fiol, 1994, 
Lave and Wenger, 1991). The development of a community of professional practice, such 
as a design group, is contingent on the development of shared (or intersubjectively 
acknowledged) meanings and language (Lave, 1991, Prus, 1991). The use of specific 
language reinforces the extent of shared understanding within a work-group and allows 
them to reconcile competing or complementary perspectives (Lanzara, 1983, Prus, 1991, 
Winograd and Flores, 1986). For example, IT developers share a vocabulary that is often 
unintelligible to other workers, but which allows them to communicate and coordinate 
work, using shorthand terms such as “this is a blue screen error”. IS design depends upon 
intersubjectivity for effective communication between team members to take place. 
Technical system designers, “successful in sharing plans and goals, create an 
environment in which efficient communication can occur” (Flor and Hutchins, 1991, 
page 54). This type of perspective-sharing requires not only shared knowledge, but also a 
shared system of sociocultural norms and values. Organizational framing is embedded 
within a local system of shared, socio-cultural values that make sense of “how we do 
things here” (Brown and Duguid, 1991, Lave and Wenger, 1991, MacLachlan and Reid, 
1994).  
 
"Knowledge and understanding (in both the cognitive and linguistic senses) do not result from formal 
operations on mental representations of an objectively existing world. Rather, they arise from the 
individual's committed participation in mutually oriented patterns of behavior that are embedded in a 
socially shared background of concerns, actions, and beliefs."  (Winograd and Flores, 1986, page 78)  
 
Orlikowski and Gash (1994) studied “technological frames”: those aspects of shared 
cognitive structures that relate to the assumptions, expectations and knowledge that 
people use to understand technology in organizations. By identifying various domains 
associated with shared framing perspectives, Orlikowski and Gash were able to identify 
differences between the technological frames held by technologists vs. those held by 
users of the technology. However, in their study, Orlikowski and Gash argued that 
members of two identifiable stakeholder groups (technologists and technology-users) 
possessed shared frames as they performed similar work, possessed similar backgrounds 
and worked within a cohesive organizational culture. This is not true in all cases: a 
general assumption that individual frames can be analyzed as representative of a specific 
interest group is highly dangerous. We cannot assume shared frames just because group 
members share a similar culture (Krauss and Fussell, 1991). We also cannot assume the 
existence of a shared culture among design group members: recently formed groups, or 
groups with new members have diverse systems of value, behavior and expectation (Lave 
and Wenger, 1991, Moreland et al., 1996). 
 
 An analysis of the degree of congruence1 between different group frames may allow us to 
understand why negotiations between different groups, or decisions taken by 
representatives from specific organizational groups, result in a specific outcome, which 
may in turn help us to predict or to manage such outcomes. But defining shared content 
depends upon the way in which the framing concept is itself  defined: we need to 
examine what is shared, to understand the degree of frame congruence (Cannon-Bowers 
and Salas, 2001). Cannon-Bowers and Salas (2001) suggest that what is shared in studies 
of shared cognition falls into four categories: (i) task-specific knowledge, relating to the 
specific, collective task in hand; (ii) task-related knowledge, experiential knowledge from 
similar tasks, of how to perform the work-processes that are required; (iii) knowledge of 
teammates, i.e. who knows what; and (iv) attitudes and beliefs that guide compatible 
interpretations of the environment. In the Orlikowski and Gash (1994) study, the 
assumption of shared frames refers only to congruence in the fourth category, attitudes 
and beliefs that guide compatible interpretations of the environment. Davidson (2002) 
extended the technological frames concept by analyzing the process of frame sharing and 
the dominance of different frame domains within a collaborative group over time. She 
discovered that the adoption of a specific, shared frame domain provided a conceptual 
boundary, or filter, to group discourse. Different frame domains became salient to the 
group at different points in the process, resulting in the adoption of a different strategy 
towards the IS design. Changes in the salient frame domain appeared to be triggered or 
accompanied by the adoption of a new group metaphor for the rationale behind the 
current design strategy. At times when the business value of IT frame-domain dominated 
group discourse, this led to a radical reconsideration of project requirements. At times 
when the IT delivery strategy frame-domain dominated group discourse, the group 
reverted to a more conservative definition of requirements, consistent with the perceived 
need to deliver a known product. This use of the term 'frame domain' thus relates to an 
intersection of the task-related, experiential-knowledge category and of the attitudes and 
beliefs category defined above (Cannon-Bowers and Salas, 2001).  
 
So the development of shared frames may lead to more coherent group action and that the 
adoption of a new framing metaphor may reflect a shift in the dominant framing domain 
that triggers a change in group strategy. But to analyze shared frames, we must be 
satisfied that frame congruence exists within a group, before we can analyze congruence 
across different groups. To do this, we need to develop some nomothetic dimensions of 
the framing domain: a reduced set of dimensions that are generalizable to other contexts. 
There are few studies that examine shared framing in any detail and none were identified 
that examine all four of the categories of knowledge suggested by Cannon-Bowers and 
Salas (2001). Such studies are highly complex, requiring detailed analysis over multiple 
data samples. 
 
                                                 
1 Frame congruence does not imply that frames are identical, but that they are related in structure 
(possessing common categories of frames) and content (with similar values in the common categories) 
Orlikowski, W. J. and Gash, D. C. (1994) Technological Frames: Making Sense of Information Technology 
in Organizations. ACM Transactions on Information Systems, 12 (2), 174-207.. 
 Distributed Cognition 
 
Star (1989) argues that the development of distributed systems should use a social 
metaphor, rather than a psychological one, where systems are tested for their ability to 
meet community goals. A social perspective requires the incorporation of differing 
viewpoints for decision-making. This accords with the position of many authors working 
on the problem of how to reflect the diversity of organizational needs in IS design (for 
example, Checkland, 1981, Checkland and Holwell, 1998, Eden, 1998, Eden et al., 1983, 
Weick, 1987, Weick, 2001). Weick (1987) discusses how teams performing collaborative 
tasks require a requisite variety of perspectives, to detect all of the significant 
environmental factors affecting collective decisions. But this is balanced by the need for a 
homogeneity of culture, within which team members can trust and interpret information 
from other team members. A wide spread of experience must be expected to cause 
problems of group cohesion and productivity (Krasner et al., 1987, Orlikowski and Gash, 
1994). Thus, an IS design that spans multiple organizational groups or knowledge 
domains involves distributed cognition. Understanding within the design team is 
distributed: each individual can comprehend only a part of how the target system of 
human activities operates (Hutchins, 1991). The implications of distributed cognition are 
shown in Figure 1. The intersection of frames represents the degree of shared knowledge 
possessed by group members. This is relatively small when compared to the union, that 
represents the total knowledge of the group. A distributed cognition perspective assumes 
that "heedful interrelating" between members of a cooperative workgroup is required for 
effective collaboration (Weick and Roberts, 1993). Heedful interrelating is accomplished 
by mobilizing the shared understanding between individuals – the intersection between 
two segments of the diagram in Figure 1. 
 
Product 
engineering 
manager 
Financial 
accounting 
manager 
IS
 manager
Production 
manager
Marketing 
manager 
Operations 
finance 
manager 
Extent of shared 
understanding 
Knowledge 
intersection, that 
can be leveraged 
for distributed 
collaboration 
(“heedful 
interrelating”) 
 
Figure 1 : The Problem Of Distributed Cognition In Collaborative Work 
Individual group members need to have some interdependency, or overlap, with other 
individuals in their framing of what needs to be done and why, to be able to coordinate 
action. But the distributed cognition perspective takes the position that there is a lack of 
overall congruence between how individuals frame organizational work. There is often an 
implicit model of a “collective mind” (Weick and Roberts, 1993) in much of the work on 
distributed cognition. But understanding is not so much shared between, as "stretched 
over" members of a cooperative group (Star, 1989). For example, a pilot may not 
understand how a navigational bearing was derived, but he shares sufficient knowledge-
 overlap with his navigator to be able to implement that bearing, as a change in direction. 
The concept of distributed cognition provides an alternative to the assumption of shared 
knowledge discussed above:  
 
“ Distributed cognition is the process whereby individuals who act autonomously within a decision 
domain make interpretations of their situation and exchange them with others with whom they have 
interdependencies so that each may act with an understanding of their own situation and that of 
others.” (Boland et al., 1994, page 457). 
 
So where does group knowledge reside? In operationalizing the concept of distributed 
knowledge, we note that interactions between individuals in collaborative work are 
mediated by “boundary objects” (Star, 1989). Boundary objects are physical artifacts, 
such as maps and diagrammatic models, that provide a representation of the superset of 
domain knowledge across various actors in cooperative work. Individuals are able to 
collaborate with others by ascribing a shared meaning to a boundary object. But boundary 
objects provide a sufficiently vague (global) representation of domain knowledge that 
they can be adapted to individual, local needs and constraints. For example, the 
topographical map of the New York subway system does not represent a detailed model 
of the locations and distances between stations. But it is sufficiently vague that it can be 
used to coordinate knowledge about what to do (“how do I get from here to there?”),  
ease of task (“do I have to change trains to get there?”), and travel costs (“which stations 
are in which travel zone?”). So it can coordinate collaboration between New York 
subway train drivers, platform guards, experienced travelers, tourists, ticket sales staff 
and ticket collectors, even when those individuals do not share the same knowledge about 
the elements that comprise the New York subway system. These physical representations 
or external products of human interaction often contain a shared understanding that is not 
possessed individually by the people who produced them (Hutchins, 1991, Star, 1989, 
Weick and Roberts, 1993). Thus, "shared" understanding is often not explicit, but 
communicated through representations of work and its context, that represent implicit and 
partial "maps" of what needs to be achieved (Hutchins, 1991, Norman, 1991, Schmidt, 
1997, Star, 1989, 1998). If we examine external representations produced through 
collaborative work, we may be able to understand the sum of the group knowledge: the 
union of individual design-frames, as distinct from the intersections that represent shared 
frames. But we have to understand that these representations are also incomplete, as they 
have to be sufficiently vague to represent different things to different people. So the 
resulting knowledge is nomothetic (reduced and generalizable), rather than ideographic 
(specific to an individual knowledge-domain and context). 
 
A distributed cognition perspective allows us to conceptualize a theory of design that 
permits agreement and negotiated outcomes while recognizing that each individual group 
member's design understanding may be incomplete, emergent and not congruent with the 
understanding of others. Established workgroups develop an understanding of who 
knows what, that allows them to operate with heedfulness to others' tasks and the division 
of collective work (Moreland et al., 1996). But local (domain-specific) knowledge is 
embedded in practice, rather than being capable of articulation (Fiol, 1994, Lave and 
Wenger, 1991). Members of  a boundary-spanning design group may not realize that they 
hold distributed knowledge or differ over locally-defined framing perspectives and so 
 may perceive misunderstandings as the consequence of political differences. For 
example, Gasson (1999)  discussed how an IS design group that involved both technical 
developers and organizational psychologists interpreted their inability to cooperate as 
“personality problems”, yet this stemmed in a large part from the different framing filters 
that they imposed on the design problem. While the technical developers framed the 
design problem as experimenting with new technology to support user collaboration in 
constructing a knowledge-base, the psychologists framed the design problem as 
understanding how, where and why users would wish to collaborate and what role 
technology could play in this process. The two frame-domains were fundamentally 
incommensurate and the group lacked a mechanism for reconciling their different 
framing perspectives. In traditional work groups, there are experts on which the group 
may rely for guidance, whereas in workgroups where knowledge is distributed across 
work-related domains, perceptions of expertise are subjective and negotiated: there is a 
"symmetry of ignorance" (Rittel, 1972). This is borne out by a study of software 
development teams performed by Faraj and Sproull (2000) indicated that the effective 
management of distributed cognition is significant in ensuring team effectiveness. While 
the possession of expertise did not directly affect team performance, the coordination of 
expertise was seen as critical to team success. Social integration was considered more 
important than having an expert on the team  (Faraj and Sproull, 2000). Thus, a shared 
understanding of who-knows-what is often more important to a collaborative design 
group than a shared understanding of the design itself. 
 
The Analysis of Framing In Studies of Social Cognition 
 
MacLachlan and Reid (1994) note that the studies of cognitive framing can take a static 
perspective, analyzing a “snapshot” of framing perspectives adopted by subjects around 
specific issues, or a dynamic analysis, where influences on the evolution of specific 
perspectives are assessed over time. The majority of research studies appear to 
conceptualize cognitive framing as static. Tan (1999, Tan and Hunter, 2002) and (Daniels 
et al., 2002) suggest that a repertory grid technique may be used for the assessment of 
individual framing perspectives. Several authors (e.g. Bougon and Komocar, 1990, 
Daniels and Johnson, 2002, Eden, 1998, Weick and Bougon, 1986) have used cognitive 
mapping (Axelrod, 1976), to elicit or compare causal models of individual and/or group 
belief-structures. (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) coined the term  “technological frames” to 
describe how individuals understand and interpret the role of technology in their work 
and organizational life. They used a qualitative analysis of themes in interview data to 
determine the extent of congruence between technological frames held by technology 
users vs. technology developers. These studies draw conclusions that avoid the question 
of how framing perspectives evolve through interaction with contextual phenomena and 
with other people, even over a short period of time (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995). In 
contrast, studies that investigate framing evolution require more complex methods and a 
longer duration. Urquhart (1999) used a discourse analysis of interview data, combined 
with videotapes of discussions between users and technical requirements analysts, to 
discover how their framing perspectives evolved through interaction. (Davidson, 2002) 
qualitatively analyzed both interview data and observational meeting data over a period 
of two and a half years, to understand differences between individual frames and the 
 changing nature of the shared technological frames held by an IS development project 
group. Gasson (1998) used a combination of discourse analysis and Soft Systems 
Methodology, to elicit and analyze explicit and implicit frames, in an 18-month study of a 
group of managers engaged in the co-design of business and IT systems. Barr et al. 
(1992) constructed cognitive cause maps from 50 letters to shareholders published by two 
companies over a 25-year period, to understand how managers’ framing perspectives 
were affected by developments in their company environment. 
 
When analyzing framing perspectives, it is important to understand two problems. The 
first is that we, as researchers are interpreting constructs that reside in the heads of others. 
Thus we encounter the intersubjectivity problem. Intersubjectivity requires a “leap of 
consciousness” (Schutz, 1967). This leap is developed further in Heidegger’s (1962) 
hermeneutic phenomenology, which takes the position that it is the interpretation of 
common experience that leads to an intersubjective understanding of another’s intention. 
As researchers, we are unlikely to possess such common experience unless we participate 
in those activities that form the subject of our subjects’ cognitive frames. It could be 
argued that it is only through “talking aloud” observation, participant observation or 
action research that we might understand the cognitive frames of our subjects. The 
second problem relates to the implicit nature of knowledge that resides “in the head”. 
Much of what we know is know-how, rather than know-what: skills-based or experiential 
knowledge that it is difficult or impossible for us to articulate (Garud, 1997, Lave and 
Wenger, 1991, Schön, 1983). We understand such knowledge through interactions with 
others and with the context in which we work (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995, Schön, 1983). 
It is often not possible to articulate such knowledge, either in a work situation, or in an 
interview situation. So eliciting framing perspectives is problematic, as subjects 
themselves may not be aware of them. 
 
The identification of metaphors used in discourse may resolve these problems (Kendall 
and Kendall, 1993, Walsham, 1993). Metaphors play a central role in the analysis of 
organizational sensemaking, as they associate the properties of familiar concepts or 
subjects to a relatively unknown subject (Grant and Oswick, 1986). Just as Weick 
(Weick, 1979) discusses cognitive maps as a belief-structure through which we filter 
external evidence, Morgan (1986) argues that the use of metaphor implies a way of 
thinking and seeing that forms our understanding of the external world. So the use of 
common metaphors may imply the existence of a shared belief structure. For example, a 
group of American IS developers may use metaphors derived from Baseball, such as 
hitting a home run or covering first base (metaphors derived from Baseball), to indicate a 
shared pride or anxiety. British IS developers use metaphors derived from Cricket, such 
as hit for six or a sticky wicket, for the same purpose. But metaphors only present a part of 
the complex and dynamic cognitive constructs – referred to here as mental models or 
“frames” – that  underlie individual and shared sensemaking (Klimoski and Mohammed, 
1994, Oswick et al., 2002).  
 
Metaphors represent an acknowledged similarity between one concept and another. We 
also need to develop ways of surfacing implicit knowledge, to understand fully how 
actors in a specific situation frame that situation. Some possible approaches are: 
 (a) Interpreting actor behavior in observational and action research studies; 
(b) Using interactive methods that have been developed to surface implicit knowledge, 
such as Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland, 1981, Checkland and Holwell, 1998), 
the analysis of organizational “stories” (Gershon and Page, 2001, Mitroff and 
Kilmann, 1975), and cognitive mapping (Axelrod, 1976, Eden, 1998); 
(c) Employing a qualitative approach that focuses on a hermeneutic and multi-faceted 
analysis of subjects’ discourse (Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994, MacLachlan and 
Reid, 1994, Oswick et al., 2002, Tannen, 1993). For example, a subject’s statement 
that they seek a document management tool might conflict with their expressed goal 
of tracking development activity-completion, indicating that they frame their problem 
as one of progress-management or worker-commitment, rather than framing the 
problem as related to the use of specific documents. 
 
Employing the lens of socially-situated cognition allows us to examine the ways in which 
internal, human, knowledge structures shape how people interpret events in a particular 
way, or sensitize them to specific events and phenomena over others (MacLachlan and 
Reid, 1994, Winograd and Flores, 1986). An IS design can be seen as the result of 
negotiation between multiple, socially-situated “worlds”, that represent reality in 
different ways to different people. The resulting IS reflects intersections between an 
overlapping set of individual and group perspectives, that shift and evolve as the design 
proceeds. Problem contents and boundaries are subjective, multiple and competing: 
"relevant" organizational problems are determined through argumentation and 
negotiation (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995, Rittel, 1972). Taking a framing perspective to 
socially-situated cognition allows us to conceptualize how similarities and differences in 
individual perspectives and understandings guide collective action. 
 
A Framework For Social Cognition in Information Systems 
 
To operationalize these levels of analysis, it is necessary to understand the different foci 
of different types of analysis and the assumptions underlying these foci. The dominant 
perspectives of socially-situated cognition, for each of the three theoretical lenses 
discussed above, are summarized in Table 1, through a discussion of how each 
perspective operationalizes the “framing” concept in different ways. 
 
 
 Table 1 : A Framework Of Analytical Perspectives On Socially-Situated Cognition in IS  
Level Nature of Concept Focus and Assumptions Exemplars 
Socially-
Situated 
Cognition 
Static framing: a snapshot 
of idiographic (locally-
specific) framing 
perspectives adopted by 
individuals.  
Defines individual frame domains and 
content to understand differences between 
individuals. Assumes that snapshot 
represents ongoing framing perspectives. 
(Tan, 1999) 
(Rommes, 2002) 
(Jacobs, 2002) 
 Dynamic framing: a 
comparative analysis of 
framing perspectives over 
time.  
Analyzes changes in, and/or influences on 
individual frame domains and content. 
(Urquhart, 1999) 
(King, 1997) 
Socially-
shared 
Cognition 
Static frame comparison: a 
nomothetic (generalizable) 
analysis of shared framing 
perspectives in an interest 
group, or between groups.  
Analyzes congruence in frame domains 
and content across members of a specific 
group, or assumes congruence within 
group, to analyze congruence between 
groups. Assumes that a snapshot 
represents beliefs, attitudes and 
knowledge generally held by subjects. 
Also assumes that frames can be reduced 
to a few, nomothetic concepts. 
(Orlikowski and 
Gash, 1994) 
(Sahay et al., 1994) 
(Barrett, 1999) 
(Gallivan, 2001) 
 Dynamic frame 
comparison: a comparative 
analysis of collective 
frames over time. 
Assumes frame congruence between 
members of work or interest group, to 
analyze changes in dominant or shared 
frames over time. 
(Davidson, 2002) 
(Gasson, 1998) 
(McLoughlin et al., 
2000) 
Distributed 
Cognition 
Static comparison of frame 
congruence and 
differences: an analysis of 
ways in which work is 
coordinated across 
different knowledge or 
work domains. 
Focuses on locally-constructed nature of 
knowledge and belief structures. 
Therefore, this type of analysis tends to 
privilege ideographic (specific) aspects of 
framing over nomothetic (generalizable) 
aspects. 
(Ciborra and 
Andreu, 2000) 
(Orlikowski, 2002) 
(Carlile, 2002) 
 Dynamic analysis of frame 
intersections and union: an 
analysis of interactions 
that permit “heedful 
interrelating” between 
collaborative group 
members. 
Analyzes distributed group work through 
the analogy of a “collective” mind. 
Examines coordination of diverse framing 
perspectives, usually privileging 
nomothetic aspects.  
(Weick and 
Roberts, 1993) 
(Gasson, 2004) 
(Hutchins and 
Klausen, 1998) 
 Transactive frame 
mediation: an analysis of 
how an external 
(technology-mediated) 
group “memory” or 
“knowledge base” may be 
constructed and used. 
Analyzes mediated “workspaces” or 
boundary-objects as a resource for 
distributed knowledge management in 
collaborative work. Assumes that 
collective, or coordinating knowledge 
may be represented in external artifacts. 
(Star, 1989) 
(Zhang and 
Norman, 1994) 
(Perry et al., 1999) 
(Suchman, 1998) 
(Hollan et al., 
2002) 
 
 
Conclusion: Application Of The Framework 
 
The literature review and the framework presented above summarized different analytical 
perspectives on the analysis of socially-situated cognition, by operationalizing the 
 different approaches to “frame” analysis that are found in the IS and related literatures. It 
can be seen that the focus and underlying assumptions of each approach are very 
different. Each approach is intended to achieve a different end and so each suffers from 
the limitations of its specific set of assumptions about the nature of the data, or the ways 
in which it can be analyzed. This is not to suggest that such analyzes are valueless. But 
the different perspectives on socially-situated cognition that are represented here are 
often conflated. This leads to muddled analyses of “technological frames” (or a similar 
construct), with no clear objective or analytical model underlying the production of 
research evidence.  
 
The framework presented here may help to clarify the selection of a specific approach to 
the analysis of socially-situated cognition. Specifically, it differentiates between different 
modes of knowing, that require different methods of investigation. The study of cognitive 
frames is a relatively recent departure for IS researchers and many concepts from the 
psychology and organizational literatures have become conflated in the process of 
translation. This framework identifies three aspects of social cognition, that are relevant 
to the current state of IS research: 
• 
• 
• 
Socially-situated cognition, which relates to an individual perspective, that is situated 
in a socio-technical context; 
Socially-shared cognition, which relates to a group perspective, that filters and guides 
shared interpretations of collective goals, contextual events and other phenomena; 
Distributed cognition, which relates to a “shared memory” or group consciousness, 
that is not possessed in common, but stretched across members of a collaborative 
group. 
Each of these aspects of framing in social cognition may be analyzed as a static construct, 
taking a “snapshot” of individual or group frames to understand differences or 
congruence between various perspectives, or a dynamic construct, tracing the evolution 
of framing perspectives over time. Additionally, the distributed cognition aspect of 
framing also has associated with it a transactive memory construct, that investigates the 
ways in which technology might mediate group knowledge resources to support 
collaborative work. 
 
Of course, the perspectives presented above are not mutually exclusive. But it is 
important to have a clear notion of what each analytical perspective achieves and to 
understand its limitations. The framework presented here depicts the different aspects of 
individual, group and inter-group frames dealt with by each analytical perspective. It is 
hoped that this will provide a mechanism to make the analysis of -- and explanations 
from -- studies of social cognition more open, explicit and rigorous. 
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